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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
sentially the same conclusion as the Memphis Oil Co. case, but they based
it on a different process of reasoning. In two cases where the facts were
virtually identical with the present case, the amendment was allowed on the
ground that all objections on the ground of form had been waived by the
investigation made of the claim and that the only purpose of the amendment
was to make a record which would be complete in form so as to aid the courts
when the case was later taken to them. Art Metal Construction Co. v. U. S.
(D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 379; Zeller v. U. S. (D. C. W. D. N. Y.
1929) 35 F. (2d) 870. The Court of Claims had taken the view that the
amendment should be allowed since the commissioner could pay on an in-
sufficiently stated claim and that the requirements as to form were only es-
sential when an appeal was made to the courts. Factors & Finance Co. v.
U. S. (Court of Claims 1932) 56 F. (2d) 903, aff'd (1933) 53 S. Ct. 287 (on
the basis of the opinion in the Memphis Oil Co. case as far as the question of
amendment was concerned).
It would seem that the result of these two cases is to encourage an attorney
who is not quite sure of the ground on which the claim is to be finally sup-
ported to file a mere general claim without making any attempt to follow the
regulations by being specific. If he does so, he can amend at any time before
the claim is rejected, while if he attempts to follow the regulations, he must
adhere to his first choice. This seems scarcely just. Moreover, any such
practice must have the effect either of forcing the agents to investigate every
feature of a complicated tax return as soon as a refund is claimed, or of be-
ing faced with claims on particular grounds for which they have not collected
the evidence, which may no longer be completely available. G. W. S., '33.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE-STATEMENTS BEFORE CoMmIs-
SIONS.-An insurance agent whose license had been revoked by the insurance
commissioner sued his former employers alleging the president of the de-
fendant company had slandered him by maliciously making false statements
to the commissioner in an effort to have his license revoked after he had
transferred to a rival company. Held. Such statements are absolutely
privileged because the insurance commissioner was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers (Tenn. 1933) 55 S. W. (2d)
767.
The scope and nature of absolute privilege have been well stated, "The
publication of defamatory words may be under an absolute or under a quali-
fied or conditional privilege. Under the former there is no liability although
the defamatory words are falsely and maliciously published. The class of
absolutely privileged communications is narrow and practically limited to
legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of state". Hassett v. Carroll
(1911) 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013; Odgers on Libel and Slander (6th ed.) 189.
When the occasion is absolutely privileged, the English courts extend this
protection whether or not the words are relevant to the proceeding. Daw-
kins v. Lord Rokeby (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 744; Seaman v. Netherclift (1876)
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2 C. P. D. 53. The prevailing American rule insists that the words be
actually relevant or that the speaker believed in good faith that they were
relevant. White v. Carroll (1870) 42 N. Y. 161; Rice v. Coolidge (1876) 121
Mass. 393.
Historically, the earliest cases in which this privilege was extended to
bodies which were not strictly courts of justice'were those in which it was
held applicable to courts martial. Jekyll v. Moore (1806) 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.)
341, 131 Eng. Repr. 658; Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, supra. The English
courts have extended the privilege arising out of judicial proceedings but
little further. They have denied its application to bodies having the power
to hold hearings and revoke licenses for cause. Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson
(1892) 1 Q. B. 431; Attwood v. Chapman (1914) 3 K. B. 275; Gatley, Law
and Practice of Libel and Slander in Civil Actions (1924) 182-185. It is
interesting to note that the opinion in the principal case quotes at length
from the opinion in the Royal Aquarium case as containing a correct state-
ment of the law, although the two cases reached diametrically opposite re-
sults (unless the kind of license involved be considered important, a distinc-
tion which is not made in any of the cases cited by the Court or found by the
author). The American courts have been more liberal in extending the
scope of this immunity, possibly because it was less dangerous since they in-
sisted that the statements be relevant. The privilege has been extended to
administrative bodies having the power to grant or revoke licenses after
hearings. McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins (1926) 214 Ky. 302,284 S. W. 88 (com-
mission to license real estate agents); Shummway v. Warrick (1922) 108
Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 301 (state banking commission having power to grant or
refuse a charter) ; Vanderzee v. M'Gregor (N. Y. 1834) 12 Wend. 545 (board
of excise for liquor licenses); Colony v. Farrow (1896) 5 App. Div. 607,39
N. Y. S. 460 (same); Werner v. Ascher (1893) 86 Wis. 349, 56 N. W. 869
(same). The same result is reached by a majority of the cases which deal
with statements before a board or official having power to remove the plain-
tiff for cause after a hearing. Peinhardt v. West (1927) 22 Ala. App. 231,
115 So. 80; Gates v. Kilgo (1901) 128 N. C. 402, 38 S. E. 931; Hancock V.
Mitchell (1919) 83 W. Va. 156, 98 S. E. 65; Larkin v. Noonan (1865) 19 Wis.
82; contra: Roche v. O'Connell (1895) 66 Conn. 175, 33 Atl. 920; Peterson V.
Steenerson (1910) 113 Minn. 87, 129 N. W. 147. The courts have refused
to extend this doctrine to cases in which the body before which the testimony
was given merely had power to investigate and report to another group which
might remove the official. Blakeslee v. Carroll (1894) 64 Conn. 223, 29 At].
473; Mundy v. Hoard (1921) 216 Mich. 478, 185 N. W. 872. The extension
of the privilege to administrative bodies having power to grant money judg-
ments has been taken almost as a matter of course. Mickens v. Davis (1931)
132 Kan. 49, 294 Pac. 896 (workmen's compensation commission); Hig-
gins v. Williams Pocahontas Coal Co. (1927) 103 W. Va. 504, 138 S. E. 112
(same); Arkansas Harbor Terminal Ry. Co. v. Taber (Tex. Comm. of App.
1921) 235 S. W. 841 (state railroad commission in a reparation case). The
Missouri Supreme Court has held that communications to the governor while
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holding hearings whether or not he should honor a rendition demand for an
alleged fugitive from justice are absolutely privileged. Brown v. Globe
Printing Co. (1908) 213 Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462 (even though the governor is
under no legal duty to act no matter what he find. Kentucky v. Dennison
(1861) 24 How. 66). The courts have disagreed whether the same doctrine
should be applied to pardon proceedings. Andrews v. Gardiner (1918) 224
N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (not applied); Connellee v. Blanton (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 163 S. W. 404 (applied). The announced test in all these cases is
whether or not the official or board in question has the attributes of a court
even though it is not part of the regular judicial hierarchy. As was pointed
out in the principal case it is not enough that the official be empowered to
hold hearings and commanded to exercise judicial discretion. His decisions
must be such that they directly affect individual rights.
The decision in the present case seems justified. If absolute privilege is
essential to the administration of justice in regular courts, it is just as es-
sential in proceedings before administrative officials when their decision af-
fects individual rights just as directly and bindingly as the decision of a
court. G. W. S., '33.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANT BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED BY
FRAD.-Two prohibition agents were admitted to a lodgeroom of the Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles on the representation that they were members in good
standing of a distant lodge of the same organization. This was false. The
cards and receipts produced on request prior to admission had been taken
from other lodges without the consent or knowledge of any of the officers or
members thereof. After the agents were admitted they were served with
intoxicating liquor for which they paid. No physical search was made of the
rooms at the time, the agents contenting themselves with observing all that
could be seen from their table. Several days later they applied for a search
warrant, using what they had seen to constitute the probable cause necessary
for its issuance. A search warrant, regular on its face, was issued and the
liquor then in the lodgerooms seized thereunder. Held, the information se-
cured by the deceptive entry was illegally obtained and therefore the subse-
quent search and seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. U. S. (C. C. A. 3, 1932)
57 F. (2d) 93.
It has become settled that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
by Federal officers cannot be used if timely objection is made. Weeks V.
U. S. (1913) 232 U. S. 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1919) 251
U. S. 385; Gould v. U. S. (1921) 255 U. S. 298; Amos v. U. S. (1921) 255
U. S. 313. The majority in the present case cite these four cases alone as
supporting their decision. Unfortunately their fact situations are so dif-
ferent that they should give but little comfort to the Court. In all four of
these cases the original search and seizure was without any attempt to pro-
cure a warrant of any kind. The Silverthorne case is the most analogous,
for in that the officers took the papers, made copies, and then returned them.
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